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Abstract 
In the midst of the global financial crisis, in October 2008, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB), 
the Hungarian national bank, noticed a selloff of government securities by foreign banks and 
a large depreciation in the exchange rate of the Hungarian forint (HUF) in foreign exchange 
(FX) markets. Hungarian banks experienced liquidity pressures due to margin calls on FX 
swap contracts, prompting the MNB and Minister of Finance to seek assistance from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the World Bank. 
The IMF and ECB approved Hungary’s requests in late 2008 to create a €20 billion facility, 
with €2.3 billion intended to back a bank support package. The program involved the 
creation of two schemes, one of which, the guarantee scheme, was funded by a Refinancing 
Guarantee Fund (RGF) and aimed to provide domestic banks with guarantees on newly 
issued interbank loans and wholesale debt contracts with foreign counterparties. Some 
analyses deemed the guarantee scheme unsuccessful, since no banks ever participated in the 
scheme, in large part due to Hungary’s own low sovereign debt rating. This prompted the 
Hungarian government to use a portion of the bank support program to extend direct on-
lending measures under a liquidity scheme to three of its largest domestic financial 
institutions in March 2009. 
Keywords: Hungary, European Union, guarantee scheme, IMF, World Bank, stand-by 
arrangement
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 








At a Glance  
In October 2008, in the midst of the global 
financial crisis, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank 
(MNB), the Hungarian national bank, noticed 
a selloff of government securities by foreign 
banks and a large depreciation in the 
exchange rate of the Hungarian forint (HUF) 
in foreign exchange (FX) markets. Due to high 
domestic interest rates, financial institutions 
had engaged in significant lending in Hungary 
in foreign currencies, which Hungarian banks 
had funded via short-term FX swap contracts. 
The termination of these swaps together with 
margin calls placed severe liquidity pressure 
on banks, straining the stability of Hungary’s 
banking sector. That month, MNB, reached 
out to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the European Central Bank (ECB), and the 
World Bank for assistance. The IMF and the 
ECB granted Hungary €20 billion in aid.  
As part of the multilateral package, a HUF 600 
billion bank support program established two 
schemes, funded individually by a HUF 300 
billion Capital Base Enhancement Fund 
(CBEF) and a HUF 300 billion Refinancing Guarantee Fund (RGF). The guarantee scheme was 
designed to provide guarantees to Hungarian bank counterparties for any newly issued 
interbank wholesale loans and debt securities. Using the RGF, the Hungarian government 
could guarantee interbank lending up to HUF 1.5 trillion. Debt guaranteed under the scheme 
would be subject to a fee that the ECB calculated to be 123.50 basis points (bps). The scheme 
covered maturities between three months and five years. 
Although the issuance window for the MNB to guarantee debt under the guarantee scheme 
was originally set to expire on June 30, 2009, and was later extended to December 31, 2009, 
no banks ever utilized the government guarantees. 
Summary Evaluation 
Many bank executives and international organizations questioned the usefulness of the 
guarantee scheme, often citing Hungary’s low sovereign credit rating as the cause. 
Ultimately, the state created a separate liquidity scheme to finance state loans to Hungary’s 
three largest financial institutions in March 2009.  
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To “secure the refinancing of the eligible 
banks and to strengthen the banks’ position in an 
international market where their competitors 
already have access to similar guarantees.” 
Announcement Date  December 22, 2008 
Operational Date February 6, 2009 




Expiration Date  
Originally June 30, 2009; 
later extended to 
December 31, 2009 
Program Size HUF 300 billion; 




Notable Features High fees relative to 
value of guarantee given 
low sovereign credit 
rating 
Hungarian Guarantee Scheme 
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Hungarian Guarantee Scheme:  Hungary Context 
 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$140.2 billion in 2007 




GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$13,919 in 2007 





rating (5-year senior 
debt) 
 












Size of banking 
system 
 
$97.7 billion in total assets in 2007 




Size of banking 
system as a 
percentage of GDP 
 
69.7% in 2007 




Size of banking 









of banking system 
 
69.4% of total banking assets in 2007 
68.9% of total banking assets in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database 
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in banking system 
64% of total banking assets in 2007 
67% of total banking assets in 2008 
 




ownership of banking 
system 
 
0% of banks owned by the state in 2007 
3.4% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Regulation & Supervision 
Survey 
Existence of deposit 
insurance 
100% of insurance on deposits up to $32,884 
in 2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to $63,725 in 
2008 
 
Source: OECD, “Financial Crisis: Deposit 










In October 2008, in the midst of the global financial crisis and the credit crunch that ensued, 
investors began pulling out investments from Hungary and selling off Hungarian 
government bonds. Due to high domestic interest rates, financial institutions had engaged in 
significant lending in Hungary in foreign currencies, which Hungarian banks had funded via 
short-term foreign exchange (FX) swap contracts. With the floating Hungarian forint 
depreciating drastically, foreign investors began to exit investments in FX swap contracts 
with Hungarian banks. Additionally, margin calls placed severe liquidity pressure on banks, 
straining the stability of Hungary’s banking sector. 
In early October, with demand for Hungarian government debt drying up and amidst low 
levels of foreign exchange reserves at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB), the Hungarian 
government requested financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
European Central Bank (ECB), and the World Bank. During the first week of November, the 
IMF and ECB authorized a €20 billion assistance package to Hungary, HUF 600 billion (€2.3 
billion)3 of which was devoted to a bank support program to create two schemes funded with 
HUF 300 billion each—a guarantee scheme and a recapitalization scheme—designed to 
alleviate liquidity pressures and increase financial stability in domestic banks (IMF 
November 2008a). 
The bank support program included the creation of a Refinancing Guarantee Fund (RGF), 
also referred to as the Debt Guarantee Fund by the World Bank, that financed the guarantee 
scheme. The scheme would provide government-backed guarantees to participating 
financial institutions for interbank loans and wholesale debt securities (IMF November 
2008a). 
On December 15, 2008, the Hungarian Parliament passed the Act on the Reinforcement of 
the Stability of the Financial Intermediary System of 2008 (the Financial Stability Act), which, 
under Article 1(1), authorized the government to implement the guarantee scheme using the 
funds provided through the RGF. The recapitalization scheme under the bank support 
program was also enabled, funded by a Capital Base Enhancement Fund (European 
Commission 2009a). (Also see Appendix A for an overview of the request for international 
assistance from the three institutions and for other details on the bank support package; see 
Buchholtz 2018b for more information on the Hungarian recapitalization scheme.) 
Program Description 
On February 12, 2009, the European Commission (EC) approved the guarantee scheme, 
thereby making it operational (European Commission 2009a). The guarantee scheme 
intended to provide guarantees on new interbank loans and any wholesale securities issued 
 
3 The exchange rate of October 31, 2008, was $1 = HUF 204 and €1 = HUF 261. 
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by domestic banks. Subordinated loans and capital investments were not eligible for 
guarantee under the scheme (IMF November 2008a). According to the request for an IMF 
stand-by arrangement, the guarantee scheme “[was] meant to bring comfort to the providers 
of wholesale funding and secure the refinancing of the eligible banks” (IMF 2008a). 
Moreover, the government believed that the guarantee scheme would “establish a level-
playing field for the Hungarian banks in an international environment where their 
competitors already have access to similar guarantees” (IMF 2008a). The scheme’s RGF was 
invested completely in euro-denominated European Union (EU) government bonds and 
managed by the MNB (Veres and Simor 2008). 
Initially, the guarantee scheme required any private domestic bank to be of systemic 
importance with regulatory capital of more than HUF 200 billion and to have secured capital 
under the program’s other component, the recapitalization scheme, in order to access the 
guarantees under the guarantee scheme (IMF November 2008a). As a result, the guarantee 
scheme effectively only covered three of Hungary’s largest financial institutions. Expanded 
liquidity facilities and blanket deposit guarantees enacted in October 2008 protected the 33 
other domestic banks that held less than the HUF 200 billion requirement (IMF 2008a). 
Between the request for assistance in October 2008 and the passage of the Financial Stability 
Act in December 2008 and in response to feedback from the European Commission, the 
Hungarian Parliament changed some of the terms of the guarantees to cover more banks 
affected by the crisis. The Hungarian Parliament removed two requirements: the 
prerequisite that a bank have regulatory capital greater than HUF 200 billion in order to 
receive guarantee assistance; and the requirement that a bank could participate in the 
guarantee scheme only if it had previously sought to participate in the recapitalization 
scheme (European Commission 2010). 
The scheme guaranteed interbank loans up to a maximum of HUF 1.5 trillion. The scheme 
guaranteed only those loans with a maturity date of between three months and five years. 
Loans with a maturity of between three years and five years could utilize only up to a third 
of the scheme’s budget (European Commission 2009a). Guarantees came with an annual 
guarantee fee, calculated by the ECB Recommendations on Government Guarantees on Bank 
Debt to be 123.50 basis points (bps). The ECB calculated this guarantee fee using a flat fee of 
50 bps, the fee used for short-term loans, plus the credit default swap (CDS) spread for the 
lowest CDS rating category of A, which was 73.50 bps (European Commission 2009a). 
The guarantee scheme also featured a limited issuance period of up to June 30, 2009, with 
the ability by the EC to approve an extension until December 31, 2009. Under EC regulations, 
any institution that caused the guarantee to be triggered through a default would also have 
to present a restructuring or liquidation plan (European Commission 2009a). 
Any institution participating in the guarantee scheme was also required to grant the 
Hungarian government a special veto share, which ultimately gave Hungary “potential 
influence in the financial institution’s decision-making” (European Commission February 
2009). The special share gave Hungary the right to “appoint at least one member to both the 
managing and the supervisory boards” of the participating institution (European 
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Commission 2009a). Last, the institution also was subject to two “behavioral conditions” that 
stated that the institution was not allowed to publicize any state assistance it received and 
required that it impose compensation and benefit restrictions on its top managers 
(European Commission 2009a). 
Outcomes 
It was apparent early to the state, through conversations with domestic bank executives, that 
banks were hesitant to participate in the scheme given Hungary’s low sovereign credit 
rating, the stringent conditions associated with participation, and the fact that the guarantee 
was only partially funded (with the HUF 300 billion guarantee fund potentially supporting 
up to HUF 1.5 trillion in guarantees) (IMF 2011).  
While the EC did extend the guarantee scheme through the end of 2009, the absence of any 
participation by credit institutions in the guarantee scheme, in part due to Hungary’s 
lingering credit risks, gave the EC reason to allow the scheme to expire without further 
prolongation (IMF 2011). 
Due to the under-subscription of both the recapitalization scheme and guarantee scheme by 
Hungarian financial institutions, banks still required immediate liquidity assistance. In 
March 2009, the Hungarian Parliament amended Law IV of 2009, which was based on Law 
XXXVIII of 1992, to authorize the government to extend uncollateralized medium-term FX 
loans under commercial terms to credit institutions in Hungary, including subsidiaries of 
foreign banks. At the end of March, the government extended loans to three different credit 
institutions4 (IMF 2011). Although the EC was not notified until late 2009 of the liquidity 
scheme’s implementation (which constituted a breach of European Union law), the EC 
nonetheless approved the liquidity scheme in January 2010 (European Commission 2010). 
(See Buchholz 2018a for more information on the Hungarian liquidity scheme.) 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The guarantee scheme was part of a bank support program funded as one 
component of an IMF, ECB, and World Bank assistance package for Hungary. 
In October 2008, the government reached out to the IMF to request financial support via a 
Stand-By Arrangement of 17 months of special drawing rights (SDR) of SDR 10.5 billion 
(€12.5 billion) for a large economic assistance package that would facilitate macroeconomic 
policies and promote financial stability throughout Hungary. The government listed three 
goals under the program (IMF 2008a): 
1) To reduce the government’s financing needs and improve long-term fiscal sustainability 
 
4 Three domestic financial institutions received loans under the liquidity scheme: OTP Bank, the largest 
Hungarian domestic bank, received HUF 400 billion; MFB, a state-owned development bank, received HUF 
170 billion; and FHB Mortgage Bank plc, a mortgage lender, received HUF 120 billion (European Commission 
2010). 
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2) To maintain adequate capitalization of the domestic banks and liquidity in domestic 
financial markets 
3) To underpin confidence and secure adequate external financing 
The Hungarian government also reached out to the ECB and the World Bank for additional 
funding. Under the package, the Hungarian government specifically wanted to sponsor a 
bank support program aimed at boosting the credibility and ensuring the soundness of all 
banks operating in Hungary. Another goal of the program was to increase the main domestic 
bank’s ability to provide for its foreign subsidiaries (IMF 2008a). The program funded the 
creation of two schemes, a recapitalization scheme and a guarantee scheme. The purpose of 
the recapitalization scheme was to strengthen the capital positions of major credit 
institutions, increase liquidity across the Hungarian banking sector, and encourage lending 
to the real economy. (European Commission 2009a). (See Appendix A and Buchholtz 2018b 
for more about the recapitalization scheme.).  
2. The Hungarian Parliament passed the Financial Stability Act to authorize the 
Hungarian government to guarantee interbank debt and loan contracts. 
On December 15, 2008, the Hungarian Parliament passed the Financial Stability Act aimed 
at “strengthening the financial intermediary system” and “limit[ing] the effects of the global 
financial crisis in Hungary and maintain[ing] its financial stability” (European Central Bank 
2009). 
3. The European Commission approved the bank support program and its guarantee 
scheme. 
After two months of analysis and deliberation over the program, the EC approved the 
program in February 2009 under Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty, which “enables the EC to 
declare aid . . . if it is necessary to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member 
State” (European Commission 2009a). The EC believed that the program’s objectives could 
sufficiently address the issues of the lack of liquidity and confidence in the Hungarian 
banking sector, as well as provide a benefit to the overall Hungarian economy (European 
Commission 2009a).  
Regarding the EC’s assessment of the guarantee scheme, the EC believed that guarantee 
schemes as a whole could help overcome global market failures that inhibited banks from 
accessing liquidity or constrained a healthy bank from serving as a financial intermediary. 
Given that the goal of the Hungarian guarantee scheme was “to provide a safety net to 
investors that purchase the newly issued debt of, or lend to, the participating institutions,” 
the EC was satisfied with the objectives of the guarantee scheme (European Commission 
2009a).  
As discussed in more detail below, the need to structure the guarantee scheme in such a way 
as to ensure EC approval significantly influenced the design of certain program features. 
4. The guarantee scheme was financed by a HUF 300 billion Refinancing Guarantee 
Fund and could provide guarantees up to HUF 1.5 trillion in total. 
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Program documents did not contain specific rationales for these figures. 
5. Domestic banks that were considered fundamentally sound and systemically 
important were eligible to participate in the guarantee scheme. 
To have been considered fundamentally sound, a credit institution was evaluated by the 
MNB and the Pénzügyi Szervezetek Állami Felügyelete, or the Hungarian Financial 
Supervisory Authority (PSZAF) (European Commission 2009a). The MNB evaluated the 
impact of the institution on markets, financial infrastructure, and other regulated entities, 
and assessed its short-term liquidity position. The PSZAF evaluated the medium-term and 
long-term liquidity positions of the applicant. Afterward, the MNB and PSZAF provided a 
recommendation to the Hungarian Minister of Finance to assess whether an institution was 
eligible for assistance and what the extent of assistance to that institution should be. 
(European Commission 2009a). 
6. Initially, banks had to have regulatory capital of more than HUF 200 billion and to 
have had participated in the recapitalization scheme to participate in the 
guarantee scheme. Later these requirements were eliminated. 
Hungary’s parliament removed these requirements following feedback from the European 
Commission. The regulatory capital requirement in particular would have limited 
participation to just three of Hungary’s largest banks. The elimination of this requirement 
was thus seen as promoting “non-discriminatory” practices and avoiding “threat[s] to distort 
competition” (European Commission 2010).  
7. The guarantee scheme covered interbank loans, which included the rollover of 
loans and wholesale debt securities. 
Program documents did not provide a specific rationale for the types of debt that were 
made eligible. 
8. The guarantee scheme guaranteed loans with a maturity of between three months 
and five years.  
Since a major portion of the Hungarian financial market relied on the housing market and 
mortgage loans, whose maturities often exceeded three years, the fund guaranteed 
interbank loans of between three years and five years. However, the EC noted that it was in 
the best interest of all parties to cover loans with as short a duration as possible, defined by 
the EC as three months. Therefore, the guarantee scheme allowed only up to approximately 
a third of the RGF to be utilized to guarantee loans with maturities of between three and five 
years. Loans with a maturity of between three and five years could be guaranteed only to a 
maximum of HUF 450 billion (European Commission 2009a). 
9. Loan and debt contracts guaranteed by the guarantee scheme had to be 
denominated in euros, Swiss francs, or Hungarian forints. 
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Program documents did not provide a specific rationale for limiting the guarantee scheme 
to these currencies.  
10.  There does not appear to have been any cap on an institution’s participation. 
Programs documents did not contain language restricting the amount of an individual 
institution’s participation in the guarantee scheme. 
11. The annual guarantee fee of 123.50 bps was based on the lowest CDS rating 
available. 
Based on the European Central Bank Recommendations on Government Guarantees on Bank 
Debt, released on October 20, 2008, any guarantee provided by the Hungarian government 
would include a flat fee of 50 bps for newly issued short-term loans, in addition to an add-on 
fee derived from CDS spreads. Because CDS spread data was generally unavailable for 
Hungarian banks, the ECB used the CDS spread on A-rated bonds, which was then 73.50 bps, 
to set the annual fee at 123.50 bps (European Commission 2009a). 
12. Participating banks had to abide by a set of “behavioral conditions.” In addition, a 
special veto share was issued to the Hungarian government as a safeguard on any 
guarantee. 
Guidance issued by the European Commission in October 2008 on the creation of credit 
guarantee programs called for the inclusion in programs of a set of safeguards “to minimize 
. . . distortions and the potential abuse of the preferential situations of beneficiaries brought 
about by a State guarantee” and “to avoid moral hazard.” This guidance did not specify what 
safeguards a program should include, but required “an adequate combination” of elements, 
including restrictions on advertising based on the guarantee, balance sheet growth, share 
buybacks, and executive compensation, some of which Hungary adopted (European 
Commission 2008). 
The state believed that to ensure that the bank support program would “not allow the credit 
institutions to expand their business in an unfair manner,” the government should impose 
behavioral conditions on any participating institution (European Commission 2009a). Those 
conditions included requiring that each participating institution not advertise any 
government assistance they received and imposing restrictions on salary, compensation, and 
other benefit plans of the top executive officers of the banks (European Commission 2009a). 
Given that the state would provide large guarantees on interbank loans, the terms of the 
guarantee scheme required that the participant grant a special veto share to the government. 
The share provided “veto rights” that allowed the state to deter decisions “which would lead 
to a misuse of funds” or could have threatened financial stability at home and abroad 
(European Commission 2009a). Some examples of the misappropriations of funds included 
issuing large dividend payments, providing large executive compensation and bonus 
payments, or extraction of funds by management (European Commission 2009a). 
13. Banks that triggered guarantees had to submit a restructuring plan. 
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Hungarian authorities intended this requirement to ensure that any institution troubled 
enough to default on its guaranteed debt would be restructured. 
14. Initially, the issuance window of the guarantee scheme was set to expire on June 
30, 2009. It was extended once, until December 31, 2009. 
The EC approved Hungary’s request to prolong the issuance window of the guarantee 
scheme until the end of 2009 in spite of the fact that no institution had sought to participate. 
The EC believed that keeping the scheme open provided reassurance to the global economy 
that the state had assistance measures in place and that restoring market confidence in 
Hungary would lower sovereign risk, thus stimulating participation in the guarantee scheme 
(European Commission 2009b). 
III. Evaluation 
The IMF stated that the “timeliness and size” of the bank support package was crucial to 
avoiding a systemic banking crisis, as well as contagion across central and southern Europe. 
The announcement of a package signaled to the market the IMF’s readiness and willingness 
to provide immediate assistance to Hungary during the crisis (IMF 2011). However, the IMF 
viewed the guarantee scheme as having been ineffective, since no bank or institution ever 
utilized it. An ex post evaluation report of the assistance to Hungary by the IMF concluded 
that the central drawback to the guarantee scheme was its design, which like other guarantee 
programs linked the credit rating of the guarantee fund to the country’s sovereign credit 
rating (IMF 2011). Unlike similar guarantee programs created in EU countries with relatively 
high sovereign credit ratings, Hungary had a relatively low rating. Two major credit rating 
agencies listed Hungary as having junk-status credit, which consequently made it 
unattractive and risky for financial institutions to rely on the guarantee (IMF 2011). 
Additional barriers to participation cited by the IMF include “appropriate, but stringent” 
conditions for participants and the fact that the guarantee was only partially funded (with 
the HUF 300 billion guarantee fund potentially supporting up to HUF 1.5 trillion in 
guarantees). 
Hungarian officials have pointed to the role of the country’s foreign exchange swap lines in 
meeting demand that might otherwise have been satisfied through the guarantee scheme. 
Banks with adequate liquidity in Hungarian forints were able to access needed foreign 
currency via the swap lines put in place by the MNB during the crisis, particularly from early 
2009 onward. 
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Appendix A: Hungary Requests International Assistance 
By 2008, Hungary had become an especially integrated investment and trade center in 
Europe. Specifically, Hungary’s integration into international banking markets left it 
extremely vulnerable to external credit shocks. The Hungarian banking sector mostly 
consisted of foreign bank subsidiaries and of a few domestic banks that depended largely on 
international bank flows (IMF 2011).  
In addition to the global credit crunch in 2008, Hungary’s high debt levels had lingered since 
the early 2000s, causing concern that the country was susceptible to exchange rate and 
maturity risks. Due to the risks Hungary presented at the time and a weakened FX market, 
many foreign investors began to sell off Hungarian government bonds (IMF 2011). 
Consequently, the Hungarian forint depreciated drastically, which consequently devalued 
the collateral underpinning HUF-denominated FX swap contracts with domestic Hungarian 
banks. This only exacerbated the concerns of foreign banks, who accelerated margin calls on 
FX swap contracts and created liquidity pressures on Hungarian banks (IMF 2011). 
A major concern for Europe was that a Hungarian financial crisis could spread contagion into 
other European financial systems, such as in Austria, Belgium, and Ireland, where banks had 
considerable bank claims and investments in Hungarian bonds (IMF 2011). With only 
enough cash to relieve pressures on its banking system for about two months, the Hungarian 
government and the Magyar Nemzeti Bank reached out to the European Central Bank for 
assistance. On October 16, 2008, the Swiss National Bank and ECB each extended their own 
€5 billion FX swap and repo facility to the MNB “to support MNB’s newly introduced euro-
liquidity operations” (Gárdos 2008). Although Hungary was part of the European Union, it 
was not part of the Eurozone, thus marking this as “the first instance of the ECB providing 
financing to a central bank outside the Eurozone” (Gárdos 2008). Unfortunately, since the 
ECB’s facility required Hungary to provide collateral with a credit rating of at least A-, for 
which Hungarian bonds did not suffice, Hungary was unable to draw upon the facility (IMF 
2011). 
Hungary’s growing economic problems motivated the state to request greater support from 
the IMF, EU, and World Bank. First, on November 6, 2008, the IMF approved a 17-month 
stand-by arrangement to Hungary with special drawing rights up to SDR 10.5 billion, with 
SDR 4.2 billion available up front. (IMF November 2008b) The EU soon followed in December 
2008 by making available up to €6.5 billion in a two-year balance of payments loan to 
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Hungary.5 The World Bank did not approve any assistance to Hungary until September 2009 
(Kerényi 2011). 
Although the IMF-EU package was intended to support a variety of different Hungarian 
economic programs, one program became a HUF 600 billion bank support facility to promote 
the stability of the Hungarian financial sector and its domestic banks (IMF November 2008a). 
The bank support program included HUF 600 billion to be split evenly between two separate 
funds. The first fund was called the Capital Base Enhancement Fund and supported a 
recapitalization scheme aimed at raising the capital adequacy ratio of eligible domestic 
banks to 14% through capital injections. It was determined that any remainder of the CBEF’s 
HUF 300 billion not utilized by banks by the expiration of the recapitalization scheme on 
March 31, 2009, would transfer over to the second fund of the bank support program, the 
Refinancing Guarantee Fund (RGF) (IMF November 2008a). The RGF financed a guarantee 
scheme, under which the state could guarantee the wholesale loans received and debt 
securities issued by domestic banks, up to a maximum of HUF 1.5 trillion (IMF November 
2008a). (See also Buchholtz 2018b for more information on the CBEF and recapitalization 
scheme.) 
The Hungarian Parliament passed the Reinforcement of the Stability of the Financial 
Intermediary System Act on December 15, 2008, which became effective on December 23. 
The Financial Stability Act granted the state the authority to recapitalize any banks operating 
in Hungary and guarantee the interbank loans of domestic banks using the two funds formed 
under the bank support package (European Commission 2009a). Last, the EC approved the 
bank support package, putting the two schemes into effect, on February 12, 2009 (European 
Commission 2009a). 
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5 The EU loan was transferred to Hungary via three installments: the first €2 billion on December 9, 2008; the 
next €2 billion on March 26, 2009; and the final €1.5 billion on July 6, 2009 (Kerényi 2011). 
755
Hungarian Guarantee Scheme Buchholtz
